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Parties to a bargaining relationship attempt to order their workplace by negotiat-
ing a collective agreement, a form of contract that establishes the terms of the
employment bargain and allocates decisionmaking power between labor and manage-
ment. Inevitably, disputes arise during the term of the collective agreement: an
employee is discharged for misconduct at work; another employee receives no vaca-
tion pay because the company claims he failed to fulfill the work eligibility require-
ment set forth in the contract;' management decides to subcontract a major mainte-
nance function instead of assigning that work to regular employees. 2 Labor and
management know that the grievance procedure will not be able to resolve every such
controversy. For this reason, virtually all collective agreements establish an arbitra-
tion mechanism providing for the private, final, and binding resolution of grievance
disputes.
A body of established principles guides the arbitrator in interpreting and apply-
ing the parties' agreement. This common law of the labor agreement can be analyzed
systematically. Disputes over the interpretation and application of overtime and pre-
mium pay provisions are among the typical issues brought to arbitration and resolved
by application of the arbitral common law. This Article will explore the ways in
which arbitrators deal with these types of disputes.
Most collective bargaining agreements include provisions for premium pay for
certain work. For example, contracts generally provide for overtime pay at one-and-
one-half times an employee's regular rate for hours worked in excess of eight hours a
day or forty hours a week. Parties also negotiate premium-pay clauses covering work
performed on a holiday, weekend, or scheduled day off, or on the sixth or seventh
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work day in a week. Pay increments often are provided for night shift work and for
unusually unpleasant or hazardous work.
3
As Arbitrator Samuel Krimsly explained in Kopper Co., Inc. ,4 "premium pay"
is a generic term used to describe two different types of situations in which labor and
management have determined that a higher than regular rate of pay is warranted.
Some premiums such as shift differentials are given to compensate employees for the
onerous nature of the duty involved. Thus, it is considered more onerous to work late at
night and straight time pay is ... increased. The increase has no relation to the quantity of
work but the quality of condition under which the work is performed.
Overtime, on the other hand, deals with the quantity of hours. Granted it is onerous
to work longer hours, but the premium is paid for extending the working time, not the
onerous nature of the work or the general working conditions.
5
Thus parties include overtime and premium pay provisions in their agreement in
part to compensate employees at enhanced rates of pay for work performed outside of
and in addition to their normal work period. Employees anticipate that a certain
period of leisure time will surround their normal shifts of work and that weekends and
holidays will be free from work responsibilities. 6 Under premium pay provisions,
management "purchases" these leisure hours at a higher unit cost. 7 Premium pay
provisions act as a disincentive to scheduling employees outside their normal work
period. 8 This, in turn, may induce greater employment by encouraging management
to hire more workers to perform the needed work at regular rates of pay.
9
Management may use enhanced levels of compensation to encourage employees
to accept extra work opportunities or less desirable assignments when acceptance is
voluntary under the collective agreement. Faced with the choice between hiring and
training additional employees or paying current employees at premium rates, man-
agement may opt for use of premium pay, especially if the pool of available and
qualified new hires is small and company staffing needs are variable.'
0
Some employees view premium pay work opportunities as a blessing; others see
them as a curse." While overtime may be a welcome source of additional earnings,
3. In its survey of major collective bargaining agreements, the Bureau of National Affairs reported in 1983 that
96% of the clauses specifying the premium rate require premium pay after eight hours. Of those provisions, 99% set the
rate at time and one-half. Sixty-nine percent of the sample contained weekly overtime pay provisions. Sixth day premiums
were found in 23% of the sample, seventh day premiums in 25% of the sample, and Saturday and Sunday premiums in
51% and 68% of the sample respectively. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 57:1-4.
Shift premiums were included in 83% of the BNA sample and hazardous work premiums in 6% of the sample. Id. at 93:3,
6.
4. 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 600 (1973).
5. Id. at 603.
6. Economy Steel Constr. Co., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 861, 863 (1966) (Updegraff, Arb.) ("It is widely and clearly
the desire of most working men today to avoid working on Saturdays and Sundays. Men in our state of civilization appear
to prefer their weekends to be available for their own personal affairs.").
7. New York Shipping Ass'n, 20 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 75, 86 (1952) (Hays, Arb.).
8. Ford Motor Co., I I Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1158, 1160 (1948) (Shulman, Arb.); John Deere Tractor Co., 3 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 737, 741 (1946) (Updegraff, Arb.) (overtime rates discourage the scheduling of long hours).
9. City of San Jose, Cal., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 732, 734 (1981) (Concepcion, Arb.); Economy Steel Constr. Co.,
47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 861, 863 (1966) (Updegraff, Arb.).
10. E.g., General Elec. Co., 31 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 403, 412 (1958) (Healy, Arb.).
11. Compare Walworth Co., 5 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 551, 552 (1946) (Selekman, Arb.) (overtime is "a valued
opportunity for increased take-home earnings") with Logan-Long Co., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 963, 967 (1973) (Dolson,
Arb.) (overtime is not "desirable" for all plant employees).
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some employees prefer to work their scheduled time and spend their leisure hours as
they choose. It is not surprising, therefore, that disputes often arise concerning
management's right to require employees to work overtime.' 2 Other frequently arbi-
trated issues include the applicability of overtime' 3 and premium pay 14 provisions,
the assignment of overtime,' 5 and the equalization of overtime opportunities.' 6 In
addition to resolving these difficult contractual issues, arbitrators must determine the
appropriate remedy for violations of premium pay provisions. 17
II. APPLICABILITY OF OVERTIME PROVISIONS
Most collective bargaining agreements provide for overtime pay, typically set at
one-and-one-half times the employees' regular rate, for hours worked beyond eight in
a day or forty in a week. ' 8 It is sometimes doubtful whether the overtime provision
applies in a given situation. In general, overtime provisions apply only to work
performed beyond the normal length of the workday or workweek. Thus, in C. 0.
Porter Machinery Co.,' 9 Arbitrator Harry Platt ruled that the overtime provision was
not applicable when the employer unilaterally changed the employees' starting and
quitting times, even though the employees left work one hour later than had been
their custom. The contract required time and one-half only after eight hours per
day, but under the new schedule, employees continued to work only eight hours.2 '
In Hawthorn Mellody Farms Dairy22 the employer argued that the employees
were not entitled to the premium rate for work on a scheduled day off because the
employees were given the option of not working. Thus they were not "required to
work" (the term used in the agreement's overtime provision).2 3 Arbitrator Dennis
McGilligan rejected this argument and sustained the grievance, relying on evidence
that in the past the employer had paid employees at the premium rate in similar
situations.24 The decision should be the same even without a past practice. In many
situations it may be difficult to distinguish a company request that an employee work
overtime from an order to do so, especially when management has the right under the
parties' agreement to compel overtime work.25 The applicability of a contractual
premium should not turn on whether an employee willingly accepts an overtime
opportunity. Although parties can specify the situations in which overtime pay is due,
it is difficult to believe the parties would adopt overtime provisions benefiting the
12. See infra text accompanying notes 71-103.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 18-40.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 167-239.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 41-70.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 114-137.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 136-166.
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
19. 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 379 (1951).
20. Id. at 381-82.
21. Id. at 381; see also Hampden Sales Ass'n, 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 62 (1949) (Hill, Arb.).
22. 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1008 (1974) (McGilligan, Arb.).
23. Id. at 1010.
24. Id. at 1011.
25. E.g., Vulcan Mold & Iron Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 292, 296 (1962) (Brecht, Arb.) (right to refuse request to
work overtime "approaches in effect the 'free vote' claimed by the typical totalitarian state").
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
reluctant employee but not the willing or eager employee. If the parties adopted such
an agreement, employees would have to feign reluctance in order to benefit from the
overtime clause. Neither management nor labor would benefit from this system.
A recurring issue concerning the applicability of the overtime clause is the
determination whether the employee has worked more than eight hours in a "day" to
qualify for premium pay. When the contract provides a precise definition of the day
for overtime measurement, for example, from 7 a.m. to 7 a.m., the arbitrator must
follow the parties' direction. If an employee worked the third shift on Wednesday
night from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. and two additional hours on Thursday from 7 a.m. until
9 a.m., but was not scheduled for the Thursday night shift, overtime pay would not
be due for the extra work. The employee has not worked more than eight hours within
the contractually defined day, 7 a.m. to 7 a.m.
In the absence of a contractual definition of the day for overtime accounting
purposes, a consistent prior practice in administering the overtime provision may be
an adequate substitute. 26 If there is neither an express contractual direction 27 nor an
established practice, the arbitrator should use the normal meaning of the word "day"
as a calendar day and resolve the dispute accordingly. 28 Thus, if "day" was not
contractually defined in the hypothetical, the employee would be entitled to one hour
at the premium rate for having worked from 12 midnight until 9 a.m. within the
Thursday calendar day. Disputes about measuring the week when the contract pro-
vides for a premium rate for hours worked in excess of forty hours during a week
should be resolved in the same fashion. The normal meaning of the word "week" as
a calendar week should be used unless the parties have defined the term in their
agreement or have established a binding past practice.
2 9
Overtime normally is based on the number of hours actually worked.30 Accord-
ingly, an employee is not entitled to include the day of a paid leave 3 1 or other paid but
unworked days3 2 in the workweek for the purpose of computing weekly overtime. On
the other hand, arbitrators have interpreted the concept of "work" quite broadly. In
Los Angeles Fire Department,33 Arbitrator William Rule addressed a claim brought
by fire control aides for overtime based on their assignment as a standby manpower
source during the fire season. 34 The employer argued that the employees were not
"working" because they performed no actual work during this time. The arbitrator
26. Ontario County, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 241,242-43 (1980) (Van Schaak, Arb.); Pacific N.W. Bell Tel., 71 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 504, 509 (1978) (Harter, Arb.); Sayles Biltmore Bleachenes Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 408, 411 (1955)
(Livengood, Arb.).
27. Arctic Utils., Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 653 (1980) (Colbert, Arb.); Mead Paper, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 699,704
(1980) (Kruger, Arb.) (practice "must give way to the Agreement").
28. May Dep't Stores Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1030 (1981) (Talarico, Arb.); Fabeicon Prods., 27 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
221 (1956) (Spaulding, Arb.) (Saturday premium applied to calendar day).
29. King Soopers, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 857 (1982) (MacLean, Arb.).
30. Murphy Oil Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1129, 1130 (1983) (Gowan, Arb.) ("[A]s a general proposition most
arbitral authority considers hours paid for but not worked as not proper for the computation of overtime except as an
agreement may clearly and expressly provide.").
31. E.g., National Linen Serv. Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 356 (1980) (Johnston, Arb.) (funeral leave).
32. E.g., Perlman-Rocque Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 684, 687 (1983) (Kapsch, Arb.) (holiday); Kerr-McGee Chem.
Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 958 (1978) (Russell, Arb.) (holiday).
33. 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 572 (1981).
34. Id.
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concluded that the employees were under their employer's control and discipline
while in camp and therefore were at "work" within the meaning of the parties'
overtime provision. 35 He reasoned by analogy:
Is the watchman who sits all night at his station while listening to a radio and perhaps
even watching T.V. not still "working"? Is the maintenance man who stands by to repair
a machine which runs perfectly not "working"? Is the receptionist in the lobby with no
visitors or phone calls for hours not "working"? Is the firefighter who sleeps soundly in
the fire house when no alarm is sounded "working"? All of these people are assigned to
be at a particular place for a particular period of time because they may be needed. They
are all "working" even though they do nothing physical or mental at the time. There is an
object or reason other than recreation or amusement to have them standing by and thus
"working" as that term is generally used.36
The same reasoning applies to the related question whether mandatory employee
activities outside of normal duties should be counted toward overtime eligibility. In
City of New Brunswick3 7 Arbitrator Margaret Chandler ruled that police officers were
entitled to overtime pay for the time they spent taking a refresher course conducted by
the city:
Participation in a management course is an activity different from those that
characterize routine police work. However, most jobs consist of two groups of activities,
the regular duties associated with the job and special assignments from one's superior.
The mandatory nature of participation in the course definitely qualified this activity as a
special assignment, and as such, any overtime involved should be compensated at [over-
time] rates .... 38
Similarly, in Jacksonville Shipyards39 Arbitrator J. Earl Williams ruled that the
premium pay provision covering time "assigned" encompassed time spent transport-
ing welders to vessels where they worked."0
IR. ASSIGNMENT OF OVERTIME
Labor and management have conflicting interests in the assignment of work and
the availability of overtime opportunities. As explained by Arbitrator Marshall Seid-
man in Ashland Chemical Co.41:
Generally, management desires flexibility in the assignment of manpower to particu-
lar job areas and job duties in order to most efficiently direct the working force. General-
ly, unions desire rigidity so that manpower is limited to working in particular areas and
performing particular tasks in order to require the employer to use additional manpower or
to pay premium rates for the use of existing manpower. The parties in negotiations each
35. Id. at 575.
36. Id. at 574; cf. Milton, On His Blindness, THE OxFORD BOOK OF ENGLISH VERSE 352 (A. Quiller-Couch, ed.
1955) ("They also serve who only stand and wait.").
37. 73 Lab. Ash. (BNA) 174 (1979).
38. Id. at 176.
39. 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 652 (1981).
40. Id. at 655; see also International Harvester Co., 22 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 196, 198 (1954) (Cole, Arb.) (hours spent
attending grievance meeting counted toward overtime: "If work is to be judged by effort, then who can deny that often an
employee works harder at such meetings than while at his routine work assignment.").
41. 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 23 (1974).
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seek to get the maximum of that quality which they each desire. However, the demands
and needs of the other provide constraints upon the ability of either to achieve its wished
for ends.
4 2
One common result of this basic conflict of interests is that the parties fail to agree on
specific contractual language. Instead, the agreement remains silent on the issue of
management's right to assign work on an overtime basis. Other parties do bargain
over the allocation of available overtime work, providing, for example, that overtime
must be distributed equally.4 3 The equalization clause may include exceptions, such
as overtime assignments of short duration 44 or of an emergency nature. 45 Some
contracts provide that an employee who begins a job on regular time may complete
the task on overtime,46 while others require that certain overtime work be assigned to
particular classifications or crafts or to employees with the required skills.47 As
Arbitrator Jeffrey Belkin noted in Sun Petroleum Products:
4 8
Workers in the skilled trades, particularly those who have gone through any sort of
apprenticeship, tend to feel strongly that their particular craft be respected, and that they
alone are qualified to perform "their" work. Management, on the other hand, has legiti-
mate objectives of economy and efficiency, and is able to point out that it does not take a
journeyman electrician to change a light bulb ....
When the union has been able to obtain express protection in the collective
agreement for "their" overtime work, the arbitrator must uphold the parties'
bargain. 50 In the absence of a contractual provision restricting the employer in the
scheduling of work, however, management retains the discretion to determine
whether work will be done on an overtime basis and who should perform that work.
For example, a company need not recall laid-off employees before assigning over-
time to other employees unless the contract so requires. 5 1 Management may be able
to subcontract certain work52 or use part-time employees53 in lieu of assigning that
work to employees on an overtime basis, or may adjust work schedules to reduce the
need for overtime assignments. 54 "[A] requirement that a company must perform
work with overtime when it can do it with straight time hours is so severe and unusual
that it may not be presumed or inferred in the absence of a clear mandate to that
42. Id. at 25.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 114-137.
44. E.g., Diamond Nat'l Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 567 (1973) (Gibson, Arb.).
45. E.g., St. Louis Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n, 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 471 (1959) (Green, Arb.).
46. E.g., Marble Cliff Quarries Co., 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 379 (1962) (Dworkin, Arb.).
47. E.g., Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 217 (1980) (Clarke, Arb.).
48. 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 300 (1978).
49. Id. at 303.
50. Id. at 304; see also, Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 336 (1964) (Volz, Arb.) (overtime
work to be assigned to employees within the classification). But see Hughes Aircraft Co., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 916. 919
(1966) (Roberts, Arb.) (company failed to assign overtime to qualified employees as required by their contract).
51. WVA Mining Equip. Co., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 479 (1983) (Merrifield, Arb.); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 378 (1979) (Stem, Arb.); Richmond Fireproof Door Co., 35 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 682 (1960)
(McIntosh, Arb.).
52. E.g., Continental Can Co., 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 809 (1969) (Cahn, Arb.); see generally Abrams & Nolan,
Subcontracting Disputes in Labor Arbitration, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 7 (1983).
53. E.g., Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 781 (1979) (Roberts, Arb.).
54. E.g.. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1156 (1981) (Mewhinney, Arb.); Olin Mathieson Chem.
Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 619, 620 (1955) (Warns, Arb.).
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effect."-55 Management retains the right to determine the number of employees
needed for the completion of an overtime assignment5 6 unless the agreement specifies
a manning requirement or minimum crew size. Management's right to determine the
duration of the overtime jobs is equally clear.
Occasionally, arbitrators have found that prior practice will bind management in
the assignment of overtime even in the absence of contractual restriction. Reasoning
in one such case that expected overtime is a valuable benefit and a major condition of
employment, Arbitrator Leo Weiss required a company to continue a practice of
assigning a rotating crew to work fourth shift hours at overtime rates. 57 Similarly,
Arbitrator Bernard Fieger in McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co. 58 ruled that man-
agement was required to follow its prior practice of offering unscheduled second shift
overtime to first shift assemblers when it was rejected by second shift assemblers. 59
Arbitrators' reliance on prior management practice in making overtime assign-
ments may be misguided. Certainly when the contract language on overtime assign-
ment is clear, a contrary practice should play no role.60 In the absence of clear
contract language on the issue of overtime assignment, the arbitrator should examine
the agreement as a whole to determine the parties' intent. Contracts generally reserve
to management the prerogative to make operational decisions and to schedule and
direct the working force. Decisions about whether work will be performed on an
overtime basis and by whom it will be performed fall within these management
rights. 6 1 In Ford Motor Co.,62 Arbitrator Harry Shulman discussed the "practices"
that affect fundamental managerial prerogatives:
[Tihere are . . . practices which are not the result of joint determination at all. They may
be mere happenstance, that is, methods that developed without design or deliberation. Or
they may be choices by Management in the exercise of managerial discretion as to the
convenient methods at the time. In such cases there is no thought of obligation or commit-
ment for the future. Such practices are merely present ways, not prescribed ways, of doing
things. The relevant item of significance is not the nature of the particular method but the
managerial freedom with respect to it. Being the product of managerial determination in
its permitted discretion such practices are, in the absence of contractual provision to the
contrary, subject to change in the same discretion. 63
In the absence of specific contract language on overtime assignment, the management
55. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 781, 789 (1979) (Roberts, Arb.).
56. Camel Mfg. Co., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1121 (1973) (Ludolf, Arb.); Gas Serv. Co., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 982
(1964) (Klamon, Arb.).
57. Liquid Air, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1200 (1979) (Weiss, Arb.).
58. 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 794 (1974).
59. Id.
60. United Vintners, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 275 (1980) (Barsamian, Arb.) (company claim of prior practice fails
in light of clear contract clause); see also, e.g., Burger Iron Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 996 (1979) (Strasshofer, Arb.);
Allied Paper, Inc. 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1179, 1182 (1977) (Tucker, Arb.); Wheland Foundry, 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5
(1965) (Williams, Arb.).
61. Eagle-Picher Co., 45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 738 (1965) (Anrod, Arb.).
62. 19 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 237 (1952).
63. Id. at 241-42.
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rights clause must be respected. Management needs flexibility to meet its daily
scheduling needs.
64
Only extraordinarily strong evidence of a tacit amendment by means of a past
practice should override the management rights clause. In order to establish a binding
commitment through past practice, a union must, at the very least, demonstrate that
the parties had consciously explored the issue of the assignment of overtime oppor-
tunities and reached some understanding on the matter. It would be sufficient, for
example, for the union to show that every time the situation arose and the union
expressly raised the issue, management acceded to the union's position.6 5 However,
in the absence of such clear evidence of an arrangement or an understanding, the
arbitrator should not rely solely on the fact that, in the past, management has assigned
overtime in a certain manner. A few examples will illustrate the better approach.
In Mallinckrodt Chemical Works66 Arbitrator Elmer Hilpert rejected a union
claim that a twenty year practice of pre-shift overtime was binding on management.
Nothing in the parties' agreement obliged the company to continue requiring em-
ployees to report at 7:45 a.m. to change into special clothing for the 8 a.m. shift.67 In
the same fashion, Arbitrator Jerome Klein, relying on a management rights clause
that reserved to the company the prerogative to "direct ... its working forces,"
68
ruled that the contract language gave management the exclusive right to determine
what work would be performed on an overtime day. 69 In spite of a prior practice to
the contrary, the express management rights clause was overriding and controlling.
The common contractual provision requiring an employer to equalize overtime
within a certain classification or grouping of employees should not be read to restrict
management's right to assign an overtime opportunity outside of that classification.
The purpose of this type of clause is to insure equity among employees within the
classification, and not to establish an entitlement to all available overtime work.
70
IV. MANAGEMENT'S RIGHT To REQUIRE AND LiMrT OVERTIME
Management's interest in productive efficiency may conflict with an employee's
desire to enjoy his off-duty hours. This conflict surfaces in disputes concerning
management's power to require employees to work hours beyond their normal sched-
ules. Employees may insist that mandatory overtime is intolerable. For example, the
union in Huron Portland Cement Co.71 argued, "[T]o say that [employees] must
work overtime anytime the Company wishes them to is putting them in continual
bondage with no hours of their own so that they can pursue a regular and normal
64. Camegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 810 (1949) (Seward, Arb.).
65. E.g., Construction Indus. Comm., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 14 (1977) (Mansfield, Arb.); Walworth Co., 5 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 551 (1946) (Selekman, Arb.) (all concerned agreed that the prevailing understanding and custom was to
assign overtime by seniority).
66. 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 267 (1961).
67. Id.
68. E. W. Bliss, 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 266, 269 (1974).
69. Id. at 266.
70. See Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 899 (1974) (High, Arb.); American Smelting &
Refining Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 340 (1972) (King, Arb.).
71. 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 735 (1948) (Platt, Arb.).
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life."7 In other situations, management may limit the amount of overtime by placing
a cap on the number of consecutive hours an employee may work. Grievances arise
when employees are denied the opportunity to work additional hours at enhanced
rates of pay.
A. Mandatory Overtime
One of the most commonly arbitrated issues involves management's right to
demand that an employee work overtime. The issue of mandatory overtime is brought
to arbitration when an employer disciplines an employee for refusing an overtime
assignment.7 3 In determining whether management has established just cause for
discipline, the arbitrator must decide initially whether management had the right to
demand that the employee work the overtime assignment.
In the absence of an express contractual stipulation74 or a binding prior un-
derstanding, 75 arbitrators universally rule that management has the right to require
employees to work reasonable amounts of overtime. 76 The mere fact that manage-
ment had not previously required overtime does not mean that it has surrendered the
right to do SO.77 Employees reasonably should expect that overtime is sometimes
necessary and that they must work assignments if ordered to do so. 78 However,
management's prerogative is not unlimited. If an employee offers a reasonable ex-
cuse, he should not be disciplined for refusal to work. 79 Moreover, an employee may
refuse to work an overtime assignment if performance of the work would endanger
his health or safety. s0 However, individual employees cannot decide on their own
that they have worked long enough and walk off the job. 1
In Ford Motor Co., 8 2 Arbitrator Harry Shulman explained that through col-
lective bargaining a union may seek to give the individual employee the option of
refusing overtime, but in the absence of contractual reference or an established
72. Id. at 740.
73. See, e.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 698 (1981) (Williams, Arb.); Standard Shade Roller
Div., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 86 (undated) (Dawson, Arb.); Vulcan Mold & Iron Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 292 (1962)
(Brecht, Arb.); see also Bucholz Mortuaries, Inc., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 623 (1977) (Roberts, Arb.) (systematic concerted
refusal of employees to accept overtime violates the no-strike clause); United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 21 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
145 (1953) (Young, Arb.) (discipline warranted for concerted refusal to work overtime to protest company's handling of
other grievances).
74. West Penn Power Co., 27 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 458 (1956) (Begley, Arb.) (contract controls; overtime voluntary).
75. Pennwalt Corp., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 626, 627 (1981) (Erbs, Arb.); Powermatic/Houdaille, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1 (1974) (Andrews, Arb.) (practice found not binding).
76. E.g., Georgetown Steel, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233 (1979) (Hall, Arb.) (based on a reading of 166 cases);
Fruehauf Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 15 (1966) (Dworkin, Arb.); Sunbeam Elec. Co., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 834 (1963)
(Helfeld, Arb.); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 810 (1949) (Seward, Arb.).
77. American Body & Equip. Co., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1172,1173 (1967) (Bothwell, Arb.); Shell Oil Co., 44 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1219, 1224 (1965) (Turkus, Arb.).
78. Allen-Bradley Co., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 909 (1963) (Fleming, Arb.).
79. Pennwalt Corp., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 626, 631 (1981) (Erbs, Arb.); Xidex Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 864, 865
(1979) (Bomstein, Arb.); American Wood Prods. Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 419 (1951) (Livengood, Arb.); John
Morrell & Co., 17 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 280 (1951) (Gilden, Arb.) (religious belief is not a reasonable excuse).
80. Pavey Envelope & Tag Corp., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 70, 71 (1982) (Cull, Arb.); Norfolk Shipbuilding &
Drydock Corp., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1020 (1980) (Maggiolo, Ar.); Dodge Mfg. Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 429 (1967)
(Epstein, Arb.).
81. Dodge Mfg. Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 429 (1967) (Epstein, Arb.).
82. 11 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1158 (1948).
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understanding, management retains the right to determine the number of hours to be
worked by employees. 83 Even in the absence of an express right to refuse overtime,
however, an employee's refusal to work may be justified under certain circum-
stances:
[W]hen an employee is asked to work overtime, he may not refuse merely because he does
not like to work more than eight hours, does not need the extra money, or for no reason at
all. But if the overtime work would unduly interfere with plans he made, then his refusal
may be justified. If he is given advance notice sufficient to enable him to alter his plans,
he must do so. But if the direction is given to him without such notice, then it would be
arbitrary to require him to forego plans which he made in justifiable reliance upon his
normal work schedule-unless, indeed, his commitments are of such trivial importance as
not to deserve consideration. A rule of thumb is not possible. What is required is sym-
pathetic consideration of the individual's situation and make-up.
84
Management may use its discretion in evaluating excuses, but that discretion must be
exercised reasonably. In Vulcan Mold and Iron Co.8 5 the employer posted a rule
requiring employees to work overtime unless they had "a bona fide special reason
satisfactory to the foreman." 86 Arbitrator Robert P. Brecht concluded that the posted
exception to compulsory overtime was not broad enough "to cover the variety of
reasons under which an employee should be able to escape from a compulsory
overtime assignment.''87 While overtime may be required as a general matter, the
employee must be excused if he has a good reason, whether that reason is satisfactory
to a particular foreman or not. 88 As Arbitrator Charles Anrod noted in Eagle-Picher
Co.,89 management must exercise its right "fairly, justly, non-discriminatorily, and
with due consideration to the employees' particular or personal circumstances."
90
In Pullman Trailmobile,91 the employer reprimanded an employee who refused
to work one hour overtime. The evidence showed that the employee had a cold and a
stiff neck and was weary from having worked ten hours of Saturday overtime.
Arbitrator J. Frederik Ekstrom ruled that the employee's request to be relieved from
overtime was reasonable and the disciplinary warning was not warranted: "Man-
agement. . . must utilize good human relations, not coercion."-
92
Any contractual prohibition of, or limitation on, mandatory overtime must be
respected.9 3 A clause expressly excusing employees from working overtime if they
83. Id. at 1160.
84. Id.; see also County of Cambria, Pa., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 625 (1978) (Duff, Arb.) (just cause established for
discharge of employee who refused to work overtime in emergency situation because of golf appointment); Anaconda
Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 698 (1962) (Peck, Arb.) (discharge too severe for employee who had a valid excuse for refusing
overtime assignment, but discipline warranted for his insolent and insubordinate response to request to work: -[I can't]
make it.").
85. 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 292 (1962) (Brecht, Arb.).
86. Id. at 297.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 298; American Wood Prods. Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 419 (1951) (Livengood, Arb.) (employee's prior
commitment to work elsewhere was found reasonable).
89. 45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 738 (1965).
90. Id. at 740.
91. 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 967 (1980) (Ekstrom, Arb.).
92. Id. at 969.
93. Stanray Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 492 (1967) (Sembower, Arb.).
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had a "valid excuse" was held to require the employer to provide "reasonable
accommodation" for a pregnant employee. 94 Similarly, a provision requiring man-
agement to "take into account.., the preferences of the employee" when assigning
overtime on a non-work day was violated when the company ordered the grievant to
work the day she had planned to move.
95
In Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 96 Arbitrator Anthony Sinicropi examined the
extent of management's right to schedule overtime in the absence of a contract
reference. In that case, the employer had scheduled Saturday overtime work on the
day after a holiday and denied holiday pay to employees who failed to report. 9 7 The
arbitrator denied a grievance seeking holiday pay, noting: "The Company had a
history of working overtime and demanding and ordering employees to do so. It had
informed new hires of their obligation to work overtime and made acceptance of that
request part of their hiring criteria.''98
In the absence of a contract restriction, management may impose reasonable
conditions for an overtime asignment, such as punctuality in reporting for the
assignment99 or the completion of Saturday overtime work in order to be assigned
Sunday overtime work.' 0 0 However, the employer may not use this right to alter a
contractually defined normal workweek. Thus in Central Telephone Co. 10 1 Arbitrator
J. Harvey Daly ruled that management did not have the right to schedule a six day
workweek when the contract specifically provided for five "'normal days' tours" as
the normal workweek. 1o2 The arbitrator found the company's claim of a past practice
of such scheduling to be unpersuasive.' 03
B. Overtime Ceiling
In the interest of productive efficiency, management may determine that em-
ployees should not be assigned more than a predetermined number of hours of
overtime work in any twenty-four hour period. Depending upon the nature of the job
in question, employee fatigue may increase the risk of accidents or substandard work.
A union may contest management's right to limit overtime, arguing that the em-
ployees are capable of safe and adequate performance. Here again, contractual
terms' ° 4 and prior understandings 0 5 may resolve the dispute. If management's limi-
94. Ionia Gen. Tire, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 324 (1980) (Roumell, Arb.); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 474 (1974) (Shearer, Arb.) (no "valid" excuse; discharge upheld).
95. Southwestern Bell, 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 202, (1973) (Wolff, Arb.); see also Stanray Corp., 48 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 492 (1967) (Sembower, Arb.) (contract allowed employee to refuse overtime for personal reasons important to the
individual).
96. 54 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 923 (1970).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 930; see also Great Lakes Spring Corp., 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779 (1949) (Kelliher, Arb.) (holiday pay
withheld for failure to report for overtime on day preceding holiday).
99. New York Tel. Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1239 (1977) (Kupsinel, Arb.).
100. M. S. Churchman Co., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 866 (1974) (Lewis, Arb.); see also McKinney Mfg. Co., 26 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 618 (1956) (Duff, Arb.) (reasonable to require employees to work Friday to be entitled to Saturday overtime).
101. 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1133 (1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1138.
104. Spaulding Fibre Co., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 441 (1974) (Shister, Arb.).
105. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 241 (1982) (Cohen, Arb.).
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tation on overtime conflicts with an express contractual right, the contract, of course,
must prevail. 1
0 6
In the absence of contractual direction, arbitrators will uphold reasonable ceil-
ings imposed by management, as long as management has shown that the extended
hours have a demonstrated impact on employees' ability to perform their assigned
tasks or create risks to employee health or safety.10 7 For example, in Airco Speer
Carbon-Graphite,10 8 Arbitrator Fred Denson ruled that the company wrongly failed
to call the grievant to perform six hours of overtime electrical work to which he was
contractually entitled as low man on the overtime roster. The company justified its
action on the basis of a policy not to schedule an employee for more than sixteen
hours in any twenty-four hour period. The grievant had just completed sixteen hours
of work. While the arbitrator recognized that the grievant's "contractual right is
subservient to health and safety considerations," the company offered no evidence
that the employee was physically or mentally incapable of performing the work. 109
The arbitrator noted "that physical and mental tolerances vary from individual to
individual" and management must base its disqualification "on some observed
physical or mental deficiency."' 10 In the absence of such evidence, the arbitrator
ruled the company's decision was unreasonable and upheld the grievance.
111
V. CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF OVERTIME
When parties bargain for express restrictions on the assignment of overtime,
management must comply with those contractual requirements even if they result in
an inefficient allocation of human resources. 112 Contract provisions may require that
overtime be offered in guaranteed increments or that overtime work of a particular
nature be assigned to employees in a certain department or classification. Contractual
provisions setting forth the required procedures for the assignment of overtime can be
lengthy and complex and still not resolve all potential disputes.
113
The most common contractual restriction on the assignment of overtime obliges
management to equalize overtime opportunities. An equalization provision obviously
limits management's flexibility. The purpose of an equalization clause "is to fairly
distribute overtime opportunities and the chance to earn premium pay among em-
ployees to prevent favoritism." 114 At the same time, an equalization provision dis-
tributes the burdens of extra work among all the affected employees. 115
106. Airco Speer Carbon-Graphite, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1187, 1191 (1980) (Denson, Arb.).
107. See, e.g., Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 859 (1974) (Porter, Arb.) (no showing made of
particular impact or risks).
108. 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1187 (1980).
109. Id. at 1190.
110. Id. at 1191.
111. Id.
112. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 817, 818 (1977) (Kossoff, Arb.).
113. E.g., Fruehauf Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 421 (1966) (Hayes, Arb.).
114. County of Cambria, Pa., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 625, 628 (1978) (Duff, Arb.); see John Deere Dubuque Tractor
Works, 35 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 495 (1960) (Larkin, Arb.).
115. Southern Can Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1183, 1189 (1977) (Jedel, Arb.).
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Often an equalization clause will contain ambiguous directions, such as the
requirement that the company make "every reasonable effort to distribute overtime
equally" 116 or distribute overtime "as equally as possible." 117 In Mead Corp.
118
Arbitrator Elmer Hilpert interpreted a provision requiring equalization "insofar as
practicable." He upheld management's decision to assign two millwrights to work
overtime to complete a project that they already had begun, thereby bypassing the
grievant, who had less accumulated overtime. 119 The condition attached to the
equalization clause allowed management to consider various factors in making the
assignment, including the relative experience of the employees involved and the
grievant's recent recovery from illness. Arbitrator Hilpert denied the grievance be-
cause the company had a rational basis for its action.12
0
The typical equalization provision does not guarantee that employees will re-
ceive overtime assignments.' 2 1 Only after management determines that overtime is
needed does the question arise of which employee should receive the overtime assign-
ment. A well-drafted equalization clause should set forth the procedure to be fol-
lowed in making that assignment decision. Unfortunately, not all equalization clauses
are well-drafted.
Failure to state the period within which overtime must be equalized, for ex-
ample, almost guarantees a dispute. Inclusion of an equalization provision in the
contract shows that the parties intend a fair allocation of overtime opportunities,
122
but obviously an even distribution cannot always be achieved on a daily or weekly
basis.' 23 Consequently arbitrators have interpreted equalization provisions to require
only a relatively equal allocation of overtime opportunities over a reasonable period
of time. 124
Under the typical equalization scheme, employees are charged with refused
overtime opportunities. The employer and employee may disagree over whether such
charges were proper under the parties' contractual plan.125 In Amax Lead Co.126
Arbitrator Raymond Roberts ruled that the company properly charged the grievant
with refused overtime when he was on an excused absence due to illness. 127 His
absence had created the overtime opportunity. Roberts reasoned: "If employees were
not charged with refused overtime because the overtime opportunity arose due to their
116. Washington Mack Trucks, Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 412, 413 (1978) (Cushman, Arb.).
117. Colt Indus., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1087, 1088 (1979) (Belshaw, Arb.).
118. 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 641 (1966).
119. Id. at 641-42.
120. Id. at 644.
121. E.g., Southern Can Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1183, 1189 (1977) (Jedel, Arb.).
122. Amax Lead Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 998, 999 (1980) (Roberts, Arb.); John Deere Dubuque Tractor Works,
35 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 495 (1960) (Larkin, Arb.).
123. See, e.g., Washington Mack Trucks, Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 412 (1978) (Cushman, Arb.); Dallas Power
Co., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 360 (1967) (Ray, Arb.); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 100 (1957) (Doyle,
Arb.).
124. Periods held to be reasonable include: one year, Hercules Powder Co., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 526 (1963)
(McCoy, Arl.); four months, North Am. Aviation, Inc., 17 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 320 (1951) (Komaroff, Arb.); and one
month, Fruehauf Trailer Co., 27 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 834, 835 (1957) (Seligson, Arb.).
125. See, e.g., Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 329 (1977) (Goodstein, Arb.).
126. 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 998 (1980).
127. Id. at 999.
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own absence, an unreasonable result would be probable in some instances and penal-
ty or forfeiture to the Company would result through no fault of its own in administer-
ing the distribution of overtime."' 2
8
An equalization scheme may present another set of questions involving an em-
ployer's assignment of overtime tasks on the basis of an individual's qualifications to
perform the needed tasks.129 Management's consideration of qualifications results in
unequal distribution of overtime opportunities because employees are not equally
able to perform all work. 130 In Colt Industries,131 Arbitrator William Belshaw en-
forced the terms of a distribution system even though the company's assignments
were motivated by its perceived production needs. 132 "That was economically sen-
sible, perhaps, but it was also contractually impermissible. 133 The evidence in-
dicated that although the employees differed in proficiency and experience, all the
employees within the equalization unit could perform the required tasks. The detailed
contract provision contained two exceptions to the equal distribution requirement,
neither of which was applicable. "While the language does not say that other ex-
ceptions ... were considered, it certainly says that some were, signifying the oppor-
tunity that others could have been, but were not embraced. That manifests an in-
tent." 134 A contrary result would follow, of course, if the equalization provision
allowed management to consider employee qualifications when allocating overtime
opportunities. 1
35
A union may argue that management must train low-overtime employees to
perform high-overtime tasks in order to fulfill the contract equalization standard.1
3 6
However meritorious as a matter of policy, this affirmative obligation should not be
imposed by an arbitrator without contractual direction or clear prior understanding to
that effect. 1
37
A few collective bargaining agreements provide for the distribution of overtime
on the basis of seniority. 138 The arbitrator should not impose a seniority criterion if
the contract itself does not, 139 unless persuasive evidence of an established practice
indicates a tacit amendment of the agreement.14
0
Management must give employees adequate notice of an overtime assignment.
An ambiguous note left at an employee's home 14 1 or a single call to a local pub
128. Id. at 1004.
129. E.g., Norris Indus., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 632 (1974) (Jones, Arb.).
130. E.g., Southwest Potash Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 314 (1958) (Beatty, Arb.).
131. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1087 (1979).
132. Id. at 1088.
133. Id. at 1090.
134. Id. (emphasis in original).
135. E.g., Washington Mack Trucks, Inc. 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 412 (1978) (Cushman, Arb.); Social Sec. Admin.,
69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1149 (1977) (Kaplan, Arb.).
136. E.g., Bridgeport Brass Co., 19 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 690, 691 (1952) (Donnelly, Arb.).
137. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 344 (1968) (Lehoczky, Arb.).
138. E.g., Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 608 (1980) (Fish, Arb.); Amtel, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 357 (1974) (Shanker, Arb.); Kellogg Co., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1217 (1974) (Bourne, Arb.); see also McCord
Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 788 (1962) (Sembower, Arb.) (length of service controls premium day assignments when
ability to perform and physical fitness are relatively equal).
139. Precision Rubber Prods. Co., 32 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 790 (1959) (Suagee, Arb.).
140. Monsanto Chem. Co., 15 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 589 (1950) (Selekman, Arb.).
141. Inland Container Corp., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 110, 111 (1980) (Boals, Arb.).
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frequented by an employee 14 2 is insufficient. At the very least, management must
attempt to locate the employee entitled to perform the overtime work if he is in the
plant. 143 In Kellogg Co.,'" Arbitrator Richard Bourne concluded that the company
had used reasonable means to find the employee entitled to receive the overtime
opportunity when the foreman checked the locker room and parking lot, and the
grievant knew that the overtime opportunity was available. 145 Cases may turn on the
precise language used in the agreement, but in the absence of contractual stipulation,
management need only use reasonable means to locate the employee who is entitled
to the overtime opportunity.
VI. REMEDIES
If the arbitrator determines that management has violated the agreement in the
assignment of overtime, he then must address the extraordinarily difficult problem of
selecting a remedy. Management's violation, even if made in good faith or as a result
of a simple error, warrants some remedy for the injured employee. 146 The agreement
itself may specify the remedy for breach of the overtime provisions,147 but more often
the arbitrator is left without express guidance.
The problem of missed overtime has been a perplexing one for arbitrators be-
cause each of the possible remedies is flawed. The two primary choices available to
the arbitrator are monetary relief and a "make-up" order. Neither remedy is without
difficulty. The former may overcompensate the grievant and constitute punitive dam-
ages, while the latter may undercompensate him or cause problems for other em-
ployees.
Monetary relief, usually in the amount of the premium rate for the number of
missed hours, is the more common of the two remedies, 148 but except in unusual
circumstances, monetary relief is not the fairer approach. Arbitrators have offered
two reasons for ordering monetary relief. The first is that alternative remedies are
insufficient to deter future contractual violations because the employer can allow an
employee to make up a lost opportunity without incurring any costs in the process. 149
This position mistakes the purpose of arbitral remedies for contractual breaches. Like
remedies for breaches of other contracts, arbitral remedies should be purely com-
pensatory and not punitive. In the words of one of the leading contract scholars:
Somewhat surprisingly, our system of contract remedies rejects, for the most part, com-
pulsion of the promisor as a goal. It does not impose criminal penalties on one who refuses
142. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 237 (1964) (Kesselman, Arb.).
143. Monsanto Chem. Co., 15 Lab. Arb. (DNA) 589 (1950) (Selekman, Arb.).
144. 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1217 (1974).
145. Id. at 1218; see also Great Lakes Spring Corp., 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779, 780 (1949) (Kelliher, Arb.)
(company posted notice of Saturday work and personally notified the grievants).
146. E.g., Thomas Truck & Caster Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1276 (1980) (Cohen, Arb.).
147. E.g., Sun Petroleum Prods. Co., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 300 (1978) (Belkin, Arb.); Potash Co. of Am., 47 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 865 (1966) (Block, Arb.).
148. M. HiLL & A. SINICROPI, RSMEDIES iN ARBrrRATnDN 122-23 (1981).
149. See, e.g., Donn Prods., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 430 (1979) (Siegal, Arb.); Morton Salt Co., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
525 (1964) (Hebert, Arb.).
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to perform his promise nor does it generally require him to pay punitive damages. Our
system of contract remedies is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach;
it is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress breach. 150
Absent unusual circumstances the arbitrator's sole objective should be to com-
pensate the grievant fully. To do more would introduce a punitive element that has no
place in contractual cases.15 ' Contrary to some assertions,' 52 motive is not relevant to
determinations of contractual remedies. In all cases the grievant is entitled to full
compensation for the harm suffered, but no more. Whether the breach was in bad
faith is irrelevant.
The second reason offered for the monetary remedy also is based on a mis-
interpretation of contract principles. Some arbitrators have held that the employee is
entitled to overtime pay for the missed hours as damages. 5 3 This position improperly
describes the damages suffered by the employee who misses an overtime assignment.
The actual loss is not the money the employee would have earned but the opportunity
to earn that money. The difference between the two positions can be illustrated by an
example of a simple problem of sales. If A breaches an agreement to sell a car worth
$10,000 to B for $9,000, B's damages are measured not by the value of the car but by
that value less what he would have exchanged for it-$1,000 rather than $10,000.
Similarly, the grievant in the typical overtime case has lost not the amount of over-
time pay but rather the chance to exchange labor for the promised amount. To give
the employee the money without requiring him to work for it would be to give him
more than he bargained for; it would, in other words, overcompensate him. Monetary
relief thus is inappropriate in the normal overtime case because it overcompensates
the grievant and imposes a penalty on the employer. In both respects, monetary relief
departs from proper principles of contract remedies.
The alternative to a monetary award is a make-up order. Typically, this remedy
directs the employer to offer the appropriate amount of overtime to the grievant in the
future. The arbitrator should specify that the new offer has to be one the grievant
would not normally have received, lest it fail to provide compensation. When over-
time is allocated by seniority, for example, the arbitrator might require that the
grievant be given the next overtime assignment without regard to seniority.S 4 The
chief benefits of the make-up remedy are the opposite of the detriments of the
monetary remedy; that is, the make-up remedy more accurately compensates the
grievant without imposing a penalty on the employer. The make-up remedy is not
without difficulties, however, and may not be appropriate for all cases.
In some circumstances, the make-up remedy will not fully compensate the
150. E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs 812 (1982) (emphasis in original).
151. Monetary awards have been defended by analogy to back-pay awards in discharge cases, e.g., Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1094, 1100 (1973) (Fellman, Arb.), but the analogy is false. In the discharge situation there is
no available alternative which would make the grievant whole. The lost work can never be retrieved. In the missed
overtime case, the grievant can be given an extra overtime opportunity and be made whole.
152. See, e.g., Menasco Mfg. Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 759 (1977) (Bergeson, Arb.); McCall Corp., 49 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 933 (1967) (Stouffer, Arb.).
153. See Hercules Powder Co., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 526, 528 (1963) (McCoy, Arb.); Phillips Chem. Co., 17 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 721 (1951) (Emery, Arb.); M. HiLL & A. SwimoRpI, supra note 148, at 123-24.
154. M. HniL & A. SrmcRoPi, supra note 148, at 125-26.
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grievant. The employee may no longer be employed by the company, may have left
the bargaining unit, may be on lay-off status, or may have transferred to another
position for which overtime is not available. 155 Obviously the make-up remedy will
not help the grievant in any of these situations and should not be used by the
arbitrator. In these cases, monetary relief is preferable.
In other circumstances the make-up remedy might be possible but would not be
as convenient for the employee as the original overtime would have been. If that is
the case, a make-up order will not provide exact compensation. In Logan-Long
Co.,15 6 for example, the company improperly bypassed a member of the labor pool
during a holiday weekend shutdown. Arbitrator William Dolson noted that overtime
was not considered desirable at the plant and that senior employees generally wel-
comed the opportunity to be off a few days. 5 7 The grievant had requested to work the
overtime in question and had the right to do so under the agreement. The arbitrator
ordered monetary compensation rather than a make-up remedy, reasoning: "It is
possible that an employee denied overtime when he desired to work it ... might not
wish to work it at a later time, particularly in the case where he has already worked a
long work week. ' ' 158 If so, affording him another opportunity to work overtime
"would fall short of making him whole for the loss. ' ' 159
Rather than awarding compensation for the unworked overtime, the arbitrator
should have tailored the make-up remedy to deal with this concern. He could have
granted the grievant the opportunity to select an overtime day to remedy his loss,
provided that the work would not otherwise have been offered to him on that day. In
this way the employee would have been made virtually whole and management
would have received work for the overtime compensation it paid. '6
Any make-up order should specify that the grievant be given an opportunity he
would not otherwise have received. Obviously the grievant would receive no com-
pensation by being given the next overtime assignment by arbitral order if he would
have received that assignment anyway. This type of preference creates a new and
more difficult problem. If one employee is given an out-of-turn overtime assignment,
a second employee will be deprived of that assignment. 16' Remedy for one breach
might cause another. The second breach might not cause a grievance, however,
because the union and other employees presumably approve of the arbitrator's objec-
tive. If the second employee does object, the arbitrator will have to analyze the
situation more carefully.
Two factors relevant to resolving this problem are the time period at issue and
the appropriate groups of workers. Some agreements specify that overtime will be
155. Logan-Long Co., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 963, 967 (1973) (Dolson, Arb.).
156. Id. at 963.
157. Id. at 964.
158. Id. at 967.
159. Id.
160. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 613, 617-18 (1970) (Bothwell, Arb.); Morton Salt
Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 525 (1964) (Hebert, Arb.).
161. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1094-95 (1973) (Fellman, Arb.); Giant Tiger Super Stores Co.,
43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1243 (1965) (Kates, Arb.); Morton Salt Co., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 525 (1964) (Hebert, Arb.); John
Deere Dubuque Tractor Works, 35 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 495 (1960) (Larkin, Arb.).
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distributed equitably during a certain accounting period. If the contract is silent, an
arbitrator may imply a reasonable period for equalization. If the accounting period
has not expired by the time the arbitrator renders the award, the make-up remedy
should create no difficulty. By means of future assignments, the employer can grant
the grievant a special turn and still equalize overtime opportunities by the end of the
period. The employee who received the original assignment already will have been
charged for it, and the aggrieved employee can be awarded a future overtime opportu-
nity without jeopardizing the contractual rights of other employees. In this situation,
make-up relief is the best possible remedy.
Given the length of time it takes to get a case to arbitration, any stated or
reasonable accounting period probably will have expired by the time the arbitrator
rules. Even so, make-up relief still may be appropriate. For example, if the member-
ship of the overtime unit has remained fairly stable, an extra overtime opportunity for
the grievant in the second quarter of the year will compensate for a missed opportu-
nity in the first quarter. The employee who wrongly benefited from the first quarter
error suffers no real harm by losing a turn in the second quarter. This remedy may not
comply exactly with the contractual objective of equalizing overtime within certain
periods, but it accomplishes the general objective of equalization with less damage to
other remedial principles than any available alternative.
The make-up remedy may not work well when the relevant group of employees
has changed significantly. The make-up remedy still would be preferable if it were
possible to create an overtime opportunity especially for the grievant;' 62 however,
this is rarely possible. The arbitrator can require that the grievant's extra opportunity
be taken from the employee who benefited from the original breach rather than from a
new or otherwise innocent employee. When the wrongly benefited employee is no
longer in the unit, however, or when no one can determine which employee benefited
from the breach, make-up relief may not be feasible and a monetary award may be
necessary.
Make-up relief may be inappropriate in another situation. If the original assign-
ment of overtime was to an employee outside the equalization unit, an order that the
grievant be given the next assignment within the unit will deprive some other member
of the unit of a turn. The remedy would come at the expense of an innocent em-
ployee. In this situation a monetary award may be the better choice.163
It may be possible to construct remedies other than full monetary compensation
or make-up. For example, a grievant might be paid at overtime rates for the next
appropriate number of hours of regular time work, such as the number of hours
wrongfully assigned to another employee. In this way the company receives the
worked hours and the employee receives the premium. Under this compromise
approach, the employee may lose the extra hours, but on the other hand he does not
actually have to work the overtime hours denied. This approach gives the grievant
162. Morton Salt Co., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 525, 531 (1964) (Hebert, Arb.); American Viscose Corp., 38 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 70-71 (1962) (Crawford, Arb.).
163. See M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 148, at 125-26, & nn. 86-92.
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only part of his claim, but it provides full compensation for the number of hours
actually worked.
In Southwestern Bell1 64 Arbitrator Helmut Wolff ordered a most unusual remedy
when the company wrongly assigned the grievant overtime on the day she was to
move her household furnishings. She worked under protest and, as a direct result of
her inability to supervise the move, her Victorian couch was ruined. The arbitrator
ordered the company to pay her for the loss of her couch!
1 65
Creative remedies may be required in peculiar circumstances, but normally the
choice will be limited to make-up or full monetary relief. Make-up is preferred as
long as it can be implemented without depriving the grievant of actual compensation
and without taking any rights from an innocent employee. A monetary award is in
order if an original assignment was outside the equalization unit or if major changes
within the unit make it impossible for a make-up order to remedy the harm without
creating a new breach.1 6
6
VII. PREMIUM PAY PROVISIONS
Collective bargaining agreements often specify situations other than overtime
when employees must be paid at higher than a regular rate of pay. Most commonly,
the work in question is performed outside the normal shifts of work and premium pay
is intended to compensate employees for the increased inconvenience. 167 Examples
include premiums paid for work on a Saturday, 168 Sunday, 169 or holiday, 170 and on
the sixth or seventh 17 1 consecutive day in a week. Other premiums compensate
employees for less desirable or more onerous work performed within regularly sched-
uled hours. 172 Examples include premiums for night shifts 17 3 and hazardous work. 174
In resolving disputes of these types, the arbitrator must determine whether the
facts of a particular situation trigger the application of a particular premium pay
provision. 175 "An arbitrator must proceed on the assumption that the parties mean
164. 61 Lab Arb. (BNA) 202 (1973).
165. Id. at 220.
166. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 148, at 129.
167. E.g., Visitron Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 677, 680 (1979) (Rybolt, Arb.); Economy Steel Constr. Co., 47
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 861, 863 (1966) (Updegraff, Arb.); General Cable Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 327 (1959) (Larson.
Arb.); Granite City Steel Co., 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1O1, 105 (1947) (Hilpert. Arb.).
168. American Optical Corp., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1195 (1980) (Foster, Arb.); Menasco Mfg. Co., 30 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 465,466 (1958) (Boles, Arb.); O'Brien Suburban Press, Inc., 21 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 290 (1953) (Donnelly, Arb.).
169. May Dep't Stores Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1030 (1981) (Talarico, Arb.); New York Shipping Ass'n, 20 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 75, 86 (1952) (Hays, Arb.); Merck & Co., I Lab. Arb. (BNA) 430, 431 (1946) (Korey, Arb.).
170. Glass Container Mfrs. Inst., 37 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 709 (1961) (Ross, Arb.); York Motor Express Co., 26 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 491 (1956) (Appleby, Arb.); Idaho Mining & Smelting Co., 5 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 7 (1946) (Cheney. Arb.).
171. Walworth Co., 5 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 551 (1946) (Selekman, Arb.); Rainbow Baking Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
153 (1980) (Craver, Arb.).
172. Visitron Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 677 (1979) (Rybolt. Arb.) (shift premium); Ideal Corrugated Box Co.. 46
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 129 (1965) (Hayes, Arb.); Enterprise Dye Works, Inc., 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 960 (1949) (Myers. Arb.).
173. Pennwoven, Inc., 14 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 649 (1950) (Willcox, Arb.); International Harvester Co., 14 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 527 (1950) (Seward, Arb.).
174. Marc Island Naval Shipyard, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 462 (1981) (Aller, Arb.); National Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 235 (1974) (Jacobs, Arb.).
175. Rohm & Haas Tex., Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 903, 904 (1981) (Nicholas, Arb.) (shift premium).
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what they say in the agreement and intended to say what is in the agreement." 176 In
some situations the bargaining history or a consistent practice may provide compel-
ling proof that a purely literal reading of the parties' contract language would not
accurately reflect the parties' mutual intent. In these extremely rare instances, the
arbitrator will interpret the contract to mean what the parties actually intended rather
than what they said.
As in other non-disciplinary cases, the union bears the burden of proving the
employer breached the agreement. 17 7 For example, the union must show that the
employee was performing work on his sixth or seventh day in the week 178 or that the
work in question was hazardous within the meaning of the contract premium pay
provision.
179
A. Sixth-Seventh Day and Saturday-Sunday Premiums
The arbitrator's main task when interpreting extra day or weekend premium pay
provisions is to determine the intent of the parties. Once that intention is determined,
the arbitrator is bound by their choices, whether he believes them wise or unwise, fair
or unfair. Contractual definitions provide the primary guideposts, and the arbitrator
therefore must start by reading the language of the contract. At times, evidence of the
parties' bargaining history and practice will clarify their intent. The following de-
cisions illustrate the common problems raised by these premium pay provisions and
the ways arbitrators have resolved the resulting grievance disputes.
Arbitrator Paul Barron addressed a claim for sixth day overtime in Amax Nickel,
Inc.18 0 The agreement provided that the workday began at 6:30 a.m. and ended at
6:30 a.m. the next day. The grievant worked his regular night shift on Monday and
Tuesday. He then worked overtime on his Wednesday night shift for four hours into
the contractually defined Thursday work day, for which he was paid at overtime
rates. He was not scheduled for a regular Thursday shift but worked his scheduled
night shift on Friday. When he was scheduled for the Saturday night shift, he claimed
that it was his sixth day in the workweek, since he had worked during Thursday as
defined in the contract. 18 1 Arbitrator Barron denied the grievance, explaining that
sixth day premium provisions are intended to compensate an employee for being
required to report to work at the plant on six separate occasions. Since the grievant
only reported to work on five separate occasions, the premium pay provision was not
applicable. 1
82
176. Precision Rubber Prods. Co., 32 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 790, 793 (1959) (Suagee, Arb.).
177. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 235, 239 (Jacobs, Arb.); Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 61
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 689, 691 (1973) (Eaton, Arb.).
178. Armstrong Rubber Co., 17 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 741-42 (1952) (Gorder, Arb.).
179. See Mare Island Naval Shipyard, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 462 (1981) (Aller, Arb.) (no hazardous levels of
airborne concentrations as required under the provision for environmental pay); see also Naval Air Rework Facility, 73
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 201 (1979) (Livengood, Arb.) (common conditions not "unusually severe" hazards requiring "en-
vironmental pay" under the contract).
180. 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 830 (1982).
181. Id. at 831.
182. Id. at 833.
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In King Soopers, Inc. 183 Arbitrator Harry MacLean ruled that the double time
premium for working the seventh consecutive day in a week was applicable when the
contract defined the normal workweek as Monday through Friday or Tuesday through
Saturday and the grievants had worked Monday through Sunday. 184 The company
claimed that the workweek had always been Sunday through Saturday but the arbitra-
tor found the past practice inconclusive, and more importantly found that the contract
definition of the workweek was clear and controlling. He suggested that if the com-
pany had wanted a clarification of the workweek definition, it should have bargained
for a change in the contract language.'
85
In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. 186 the parties asked Arbitrator Roland Strass-
hofer to determine whether employees were entitled to double time pay for time spent
on a Sunday travelling to attend a required out-of-state nuclear reactor start-up train-
ing program. The agreement required payment at double time for "time worked" on
Sunday and required payment at the "regular straight time rate when participating in
the training program."' 87 Relying on evidence of the parties' detailed discussions
and correspondence concerning the training programs, the arbitrator concluded that
travel time was not intended to be treated as time worked. The premium rate therefore
was inapplicable.' 8
8
Arbitrator Jerome Katz denied a claim for Sunday double time pay in Alexan-
der's Personnel Providers, Inc.'8 9 despite a contract provision requiring payment at
the premium rate.190 When the parties negotiated their agreement, the company's
stores were closed on Sundays because of the state's Blue Laws. The company began
opening its stores on Sunday after the statute was declared unconstitutional. The
arbitrator ruled that the union bore the burden of proving that when the parties agreed
to the double time provision, they both knew and intended that it was to apply to the
then totally unforeseeable circumstance of regular Sunday openings. Since the union
could not meet this burden, the grievance was denied.' 9'
Arbitrator Katz incorrectly substituted his views of a wise policy for the words
of the contract. Often parties to a collective agreement agree to provisions that
produce unforeseeable results when conditions change. Parties must live with their
deal or bargain to change it. 192 A Sunday premium pay provision is intended to
compensate employees at enhanced rates of pay for work on a day of rest, which for
183. 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 857 (1982).
184. Id.
185, Id. at 864.
186. 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1042 (1980).
187. Id. at 1042-43.
188. Id. at 1045.
189. 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249 (1977).
190. Id. at 249-50.
191. Id. at 253.
192. Arbitrator Bernard Marcus noted in Scott Paper Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 838, 841 (1977):
This is not the first and certainly will not be the last grievance which achieves a result, based on
interpretation of contract language, which appears to provide an unexpected windfall to one of the parties at the
expense of the other. However, the arbitrator is a creature of the contract and may depart from the consequences
of contract language only in extremely limited situations.
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many constitutes the Sabbath. 193 Legalization of Sunday sales should not disturb the
parties' express understanding of the premium an employer must pay to purchase
Sunday work. The employer may not have foreseen a need to assign employees to
Sunday work on a regular basis, but when that need arose the agreement set the terms
of compensation.
In American Optical Corp. 194 the contract provided: "All work on Saturday
shall be considered as overtime for which time and one-half will be paid." 195 Arbitra-
tor Howard Foster held that a third shift worker whose shift began at 11 p.m. on
Friday was entitled to premium pay for all hours he worked on Saturday. The
company had argued that the premium rate should apply only when Saturday was an
overtime day or an additional day worked apart from the normal Monday through
Friday schedule. The arbitrator rejected that reading, noting that the contract lan-
guage expressly stated that "all" Saturday work was to be treated as overtime
work.
196
Compelling evidence of bargaining history and actual practice over a ten year
period led another arbitrator to interpret similar language differently. In Vlasic
Foods, Inc.197 Arbitrator Nathan Lipson held that the "evidence strongly suggests
that the parties adopted and readopted the ... language with the understanding that
it would be applied in accordance with the Company practice," which was to pay the
premium rates only to shifts beginning on Saturday. 198 In general, an arbitrator
should take the parties at their word and allow their contract language to control.
However, when bargaining history demonstrates with convincing clarity precisely
what the parties meant by the language, their true intent must prevail over erroneous-
ly chosen words. Without such compelling evidence, the arbitrator simply should
read and apply the contract. 199
B. Holiday Premiums
As with other premium pay situations, premium pay for work performed on a
holiday may be required in order to discourage employers from scheduling employees
on holidays and to compensate employees for the loss of their free holiday time.200
The parties' language must be read logically to determine their intent,20 1 and the
bargaining history may be useful when the provision is ambiguous. 202 Intention
depends more on objective evidence than on subjective or belated desires. In one
remarkable case, the employer justified its refusal to pay employees the triple time
193. Granite City Steel Co., 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101. 109 (1947) (Perlstein, Arb., dissenting); Merck & Co., I Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 430, 434 (1946) (Korey, Arb.).
194. 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1195 (1980) (Foster, Arb.).
195. Id. at 1196.
196. Id. at 1198.
197. 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1214 (1980).
198. Id. at 1217.
199. May Dep't Stores Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1030 (1981) (Talarico, Arb.).
200. See, e.g., Southern Standard Bag Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 26 (1966) (Whyte. Arb.); Weaver Mfg. Div., 39
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1262, 1264-65 (1962) (Sembower, Arb.); Kimberly-Clark Corp.. 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 598 (1949)
(Jaffe, Arb.); Eastern Stainless Steel Corp., 7 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 267 (1947) (Selekman, Arb.).
201. See Knox County Comm'rs, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 774 (1983) (Chandler, Arb.).
202. E.g., Southern Standard Bag Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 26 (1966) (Whyte, Arb.).
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rate required by the holiday premium pay provision on the ground that the employer's
negotiator had not read the contract carefully before he signed it!203 The arbitrator
properly rejected this disingenuous argument204
It will not always be clear whether the day in question is in fact a holiday for
premium pay purposes under the collective bargaining agreement. 20 5 Bargaining
history, 20 6 prior practice, 2 0 7 and decisions involving pay for unworked holidays 20 8
should be examined to interpret the contract references.
In Alabama By-Products Corp.20 9 Arbitrator H. H. Grooms addressed a claim
for premium pay by an employee who had planned to work on his birthday-a
holiday under the agreement-but who was unable to do so because he was called to
jury duty that week. 210 The employee was paid jury duty pay for the week under the
agreement and straight time pay for his unworked birthday holiday. As a result, the
employee lost the opportunity to earn two shifts of pay because he would have
received triple time under the contract if he had worked his birthday holiday. While
denying the request for monetary relief, the arbitrator exercised his sense of "equity
and good conscience" and ordered the company to allow the grievant to designate
another day as his birthday. 211 The arbitrator's concern for the employee's un-
fortunate plight and his devotion to his civic duty are understandable, but it is
inevitable that some contract benefits will be affected by fortuitous circumstances.
Here, for example, the grievant earned jury duty pay without performing any work
for the company. In effect, he received a windfall. Management could not be blamed
for the grievant's misfortune, and the agreement provided for only one birthday
holiday a year. The arbitrator should have denied the grievance; he had no power to
do more than interpret the agreement. By comparison, in Poe Coal Co.,212 the same
arbitrator properly upheld a claim for premium holiday pay when the evidence
showed that the company refused to allow the employee to work on his birthday. 2 13
In this instance, the arbitrator correctly ruled that pay was due because the employer's
action was taken solely to avoid the contractual holiday pay obligation. 2 14
C. Shift Differentials
Arbitrator Lennart Larson distinguished shift differentials from overtime pre-
miums in General Cable Corp. :215
203. Theodore Mayer & Bros., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 540 (1974) (McIntosh, Arb.).
204. Id. at 542.
205. Association of D.C. Liquor Wholesalers, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 998 (1980) (Oldham, Arb.); Cahokia
Downs. Inc., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 282 (1977) (Davis, Arb.); Glass Container Mfrs. Inst., 37 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 709
(1961) (Ross, Arb.).
206. Ionia Gen. Tire, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 616, 619-20 (1979) (McDonald, Arb.) (language in prior contract
changed in negotiations).
207. Yoder Bros., Inc., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 115 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.).
208. See Abrams & Nolan, Resolving Holiday Pav Disputes in Labor Arbitration, 33 CASE W. REs. 380 (1983).
209. 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 992 (1977).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 994.
212. 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 240 (1974) (Grooms, Arb.).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 245.
215. 33 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 327 (1959).
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The purpose of shift differentials is to compensate for the inconvenience of being
regularly assigned to an afternoon or night shift. A prime purpose of overtime payments is
to compensate for long hours, before or after one's regular eight hours. Necessarily,
overtime hours cause a day employee to work outside his regular shift. For this he receives
a premium rate (time and one-half). He is not entitled to a shift premium for these hours
because he does not work them regularly, and he is compensated for the long and irregular
hours by the overtime rate.
216
Thus, in Visitron Corp.2 17 when a mechanic who regularly worked the day shift was
assigned fill-in work from 7:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., he was entitled to overtime pay
but not to the shift differential.2 18
Shift differentials compensate employees for the extra burdens of working a
regular night shift.2 19 As Arbitrator Bertram Willcox explained in Pennwoven,
Inc.,220 shift premiums are established "out of consideration for the inconvenience,
and disruption of normal living customs, caused to a worker by having to work on a
late shift. A special payment is made, in other words, for sleeping by day and
working by night."
22 1
In Universal Atlas Cement Co. 222 the contract required a shift differential only
for employees regularly working the afternoon and evening shifts. The company
incorrectly had paid the shift differential to certain day shift employees for the hours
they worked in the afternoon.223 When it realized its error, the company corrected its
practice and gave the union written notice. Arbitrator Jules Justin denied the union's
grievance protesting the change, ruling that the company could correct its mistake
and abide by the contractual language. 224 In contrast, Arbitrator Charles Anrod
refused to enforce clear contract language in Great Lakes Carbon Corp.,225 which
provided that "[a]pplicable shift differentials will be added to holiday pay only when
the holiday is actually worked.", 226 For nine years, the company had failed to add the
differentials to the holiday pay and none of the affected employees had grieved. The
union was aware of the practice and allowed it to continue without challenge. Based
on this history, the arbitrator denied a grievance seeking the shift differential.22 7
Although long-term acceptance of a practice through a series of negotiations
may indicate that the union has agreed to a change in the contract, an arbitrator should
be very cautious about ignoring a clear contractual promise. Management's prior
conduct denying a benefit may simply constitute a series of contract violations. In the
216. Id. at 329 (emphasis in original).
217. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 677 (1979) (Rybolt, Arb.).
218. Id.
219. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 129 (1965) (Hayes, Arb.); Public Serv. Elee. & Gas Co., 2
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 2 (1946) (Gellhorn, Arb.).
220. 14 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 649 (1950).
221. Id. at 651.
222. 32 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 999 (1959) (Justin, Arb.).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1002.
225. 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1173 (1964).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1176.
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absence of compelling evidence of a tacit amendment, changes should be made at the
bargaining table.
D. Choice of Premium Provisions
Now and then there may be some doubt as to which of two premium pay
provisions applies in a given situation. The arbitrator may have to look to outside
factors in order to resolve the doubt. In Cleveland Board of Education 28 two unions
representing custodians claimed that the school board wrongly paid employees under
the emergency clause time and one-half premium rate instead of the inspection clause
double time premium rate for weekend inspection work. 229 The school board argued
that the severe winter weather constituted an emergency situation and that the board's
action was in accordance with the parties' agreements. The arbitrator sustained the
grievance because the calendar dates within which the inspections were to be con-
ducted indicated that the parties had contemplated severe winter weather conditions
when they agreed to the inspection clause. His conclusion was buttressed by an
established past practice of paying employees for the weekend work in accordance




At one time the pyramiding of premium pay constituted a major arbitration
issue.23 ' Today, parties customarily prohibit pyramiding. 232 However, the question
of what constitutes the prohibited pyramiding remains.2 33
Arbitrator Hiram Lesar in King-Seeley Thermos Co. 2 34 defined pyramiding as
"piling on by paying at two different rates for the same hours of work.", 235 He
offered the following example of pyramiding forbidden by a contract that provided
for double time for work on Sunday and time and one-half for work in excess of eight
hours: If an employee worked from 11 p.m. Saturday until 11 a.m. Sunday, the last
four hours would be overtime since they were in excess of eight hours. "But to pay
the employee at a rate of three and one-half times (double for Sunday and time and
one-half for overtime) his regular rate of pay would be pyramiding. So he gets the
larger of the two rates, double time.' '236
In Teledyne Monarch Rubber,237 an employee was paid at a double time rate for
228. 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 387 (1983) (Abrams, Arb.).
229. Id. at 338-39.
230. Id. at 389; see also Utility Appliance Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 775 (1953) (Cheney, Arb.) (work on
Saturday holiday compensated at holiday double time rate, not Saturday time and one-half rate).
231. See, e.g., York Motor Express Co., 26 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 491 (1956) (Appleby, Arb.).
232. E.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 544 (1973) (Lesar, Arb.).
233. Marx Toys, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1206, 1207-8 (1977) (Kreimer, Arb.); Transparent Package Co., 24 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 247 (1955) (Kelliher, Arb.).
234. 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 544 (1973).
235. Id. at 546.
236. Id.; see Safeway Stores, 45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1163 (1965) (Atkins, Arb.); Hooker Chem. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 191 (1964) (Russell, Arb.).
237. 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1052 (1973) (Baldwin, Arb.).
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his work from 3 p.m. until 11 p.m. on Sunday. He then worked his regular 7 a.m. to
3 p.m. shift on Monday. 238 The employee grieved, claiming that he was entitled to
pay at a time and one-half rate for the Monday hours since the contract provided for
that premium for all hours worked in excess of eight hours in "any 24-hour period."
Management argued that this would constitute pyramiding expressly forbidden by the
contract. Arbitrator Ben Baldwin sustained the grievance because the employee was
not attempting "to collect overtime pay for the same hours worked under two or more
sections of the contract. "239
VIII. CONCLUSION
To resolve disputes involving overtime and premium pay provisions, the arbitra-
tor must marshal all of his interpretive talents. Principles for the resolution of these
types of disputes are well established, but the task of adjudication is neither easy nor
mechanical.
In the absence of contractual restriction, management has a broad range of
discretion in the assignment of overtime. No one is entitled to an overtime assignment
unless the contract so provides. Management may seek productive efficiency by
deciding whether overtime will be worked, how many employees are needed for the
task, how long the job should last, and who will receive the assignment. Contract
terms may overrule efficiency goals, however. For example, when the parties have
agreed to a procedure for the allocation of available overtime by reserving that work
to employees in certain classifications or departments, the arbitrator must hold man-
agement to its bargain.
To remedy violations of overtime provisions, especially in the difficult area of
overtime equalization, the arbitrator must make the aggrieved employee whole with-
out depriving other employees of their rights and, as far as possible, without impos-
ing a penalty on the employer. Usually a make-up order can achieve these objectives,
but in some circumstances a monetary award will be required.
Premium pay provisions also present a myriad of problems in interpretation and
application. The arbitrator must ascertain the parties' intent and determine whether
the facts of the case mandate the payment of the premium rate.
When the parties agree that employee time will be paid at a premium, they
recognize that disputes will arise regarding the scope and applicability of their bar-
gain. As a result, labor and management entrust to their chosen neutral the final and
binding resolution of those disputes. They anticipate that the arbitrator will apply the
generally understood standards of dispute resolution in this area in a manner that will
resolve the controversy consistently with their agreement. The arbitrator must fulfill
those legitimate expectations.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1053.
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